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DID THE EUROPEAN FREE
MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND
RESIDENCE DIRECTIVE
CHANGE MIGRATION






n April 2004, the European Parliament and the
Council of the European Union adopted Direc-
tive 2004/38/EC “on the right of citizens of the Un-
ion and their family members to move and reside
freely within the territory of the Member States”,the
so called “European Free Movement of Persons and
Residence Directive”.The adoption of the Directive
is controversial and has triggered debates across
Europe. This is especially the case in Germany with
its well developed welfare state. Some experts argue
that the free movement of persons represents a basic
condition for making a single European market fully
effective. People would move from areas with low
economic opportunities to the centres of economic
activity.The outcome would be a better allocation of
production factors within the European Union
(Sachverständigenrat,2004,117–118).Other experts,
however, raise concerns about potential welfare
tourism. According to them, people would move
from areas with low social standards towards regions
with more generous social support.The result would
be a free ride to the social welfare state (Sinn 2004,
Sinn and Ochel 2003 and Sinn et al. 2003).
Who is right: the optimists, who expect low levels of
economic arbitrage migration or the pessimists, who
expect high rates of social benefits arbitrage migra-
tion? In the following, we aim to bring together a
variety of aspects related to the European Free
Movement Directive and its potential influence on
migration patterns within the EU. First, migration
trends of EU-14 nationals (old EU Member States
excluding Germany) to Germany are examined. In
this context, we look at flows as well as at the com-
position in terms of age structure and employment
status. We focus on the “old” EU members because
transitional arrangements (TAs) have excluded free
mobility for the eight new Eastern European mem-
ber countries for the moment. The acquis commu-
nautaire will be fully applicable in all Member States
after a two-phased transition period of five years
(with a review after three years) and a possible pro-
longation for individual Member States for an addi-
tional two-year period. Sweden and Ireland decided
not to apply any TAs to the new EU states from the
beginning of their EU membership (on 1 May 2004).
The UK abolished ex-ante restrictions and has kept
a Workers Registration Scheme only. Greece, Portu-
gal, Finland and Spain lifted the restrictions in 2006.
Most of the other EU countries have decided to
abandon the restrictions in the near future. Only
Austria and Germany are still applying the TAs in a
rather restrictive way – most probably until the TAs
irrevocably come to an end on 30 April 2011. Thus,
we cannot consider the effects of the “Free Move-
ment and Residence Directive” for the migration
flows from Eastern Europe to Germany in isolation
from the last two years.
Secondly, in particular in the context of welfare
tourism, the Swedish case after EU-enlargement can-
not be ignored and is thus dealt with here. Sweden
was one of the countries that did not apply any TA to
new EU Member States. Thus, it is useful to have a
closer look at whether changes in the migration flows
to Sweden can be observed after such a short period.
The theory of immobility could provide some
insights into a rather slow and weak reaction to the
lifting of mobility restrictions within the EU. Using
what we call the Insider-Advantage Approach, we
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argue that it is reasonable to ex-
pect lower rather than higher
intra-European migration flows.
Lastly, we turn to the impact of
immigration on public finances.
The literature that includes third
country-nationals provides a use-
ful starting point and would sug-
gest that the European experi-
ence of the effects on public cof-
fers is mixed.
While taking into account the
scarce evidence available at this
early stage of the Directive, we
conclude that arguments sus-
taining the probability of large
changes in migration patterns within the EU, in par-
ticular towards countries with generous welfare sys-
tems, are not justified. At least for the moment and
with regard to the first – still limited – empirical evi-
dence, we conclude that the European Free Move-
ment of Persons and Residence Directive has not had
a statistically significant impact on the size and struc-
ture of European migration flows. Furthermore, we
would not expect that intra-European migration
flows will reach a dimension posing any serious threat
to jobs, wages and public coffers in the destination
countries in the future. Quite the contrary: intra EU
migration might help to overcome some of the eco-
nomic and demographic challenges of the future.
Migration trends of EU-14 nationals to Germany
In the case of Germany, a net outflow of migrants
originating from the EU-14 has been registered since
the early 1990s. This net loss migration peaked in
2004, when Germany experienced an inflow of
92,931 EU-14 nationals against an outflow of
126,748.When looking at the migrants by nationality
in more detail, the picture for the year 2005 presents
itself as follows in the table below. For some of the
listed countries there was a significant outflow of
residents from Germany.
Especially nationals from the traditional labour
exporting countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy and
Portugal exhibit a negative net migration, while a
clear net gain in migration is noted with regard to
nationals from France and the Netherlands.However,
our own calculations using data from the Federal
Statistical Office of Germany show that even though
there is a slight increase in the inflows of EU-14
nationals to Germany for the year 2005, the overall
flows still represent a net loss in migration.
Besides observing these trends in migration flows
and stocks, it is imperative to determine further
their disaggregated composition. Only a closer look
at the individual characteristics of migrants would
allow an assessment of their likelihood of being or
becoming welfare migrants. First, the age structure
of migrants can provide valuable insights both into
their potential labour market performance (i.e. the
younger they are the more motivated they should
be) and their prospective dependence on social ben-
efits (e.g.old-age pension). When looking at the age
structure of EU-14 nationals in Germany in 2005,
one can easily observe that the majority is fairly
young.Whereas for the categories “under 25 years”
and “above 65 years” the figures for EU-14 nation-
als are below those for Germans, EU-14 nationals
are over- represented in the working age categories.
As far as the age category of 25 to 34-year-olds is
concerned,the figure for the EU-14 nationals is con-
siderably higher than that for Germans. Given that
the number of migrants aged below 25 is relatively
small, no major additional education-related costs
are to be expected.
Main in-/outflows from EU-14 to Germany in 2005 
Nationals Leaving Arriving
Italian 27,118  18,349 
French 10,354  12,260 
Greek 16,391  8,975 
Dutch 5,479  10,088 
UK 7,864  7,853 
Spanish 8,185  7,147 
Portuguese 6,912 5,010 















Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany; own calculations.
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Figure 1Secondly, the employment status of EU-14 nationals
under 65 years in comparison with Germans of the
same age is an important indicator for determining
their likely dependence upon social benefits.A total
of 68.1 percent of the EU-14 population present in
Germany in 2005 was employed, while the equiva-
lent figure for Germans was 66.7 percent. Their
unemployment rates seem to be slightly higher than
those of Germans, but this is also a result of their
higher participation rates in the labour force.
In general since the early 1990s there has been a con-
stant trend towards a net loss in migration of EU-14
nationals to Germany,a trend that reached its height
in 2004. For 2005, the overall migration level of EU-
14 nationals was still negative, even though a slight
upward trend was observed. Net loss migration fig-
ures were particularly high for nationals from Italy
and Greece in 2005,both of which are countries with
relatively unattractive social welfare systems.
EU-14 nationals present in Ger-
many in 2005 were fairly young
and well-represented in the work-
ing age categories of 25–54 years,
with a particularly high share in
the age group of 24 to 34 years.
Finally, nationals from EU-14
countries display high employ-
ment levels,which are even slight-
ly higher than those of Germans.
Welfare tourism to Sweden?1
Together with Ireland and the
UK, Sweden did not introduce
the TAs in the context of the EU-
enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. It
allowed the free movement of workers and was the
only country to grant unrestricted access to its social
welfare system. This unlimited access to the welfare
system could have theoretically resulted in an in-
crease in welfare tourism; however, this has not
proven to be the case.
First results indicate that immigration to Sweden
from the ten new Member States did not become an
uncontrolled flood. Data on residence permits for
work purposes show that the number of EU-10 citi-
zens increased from 3,800 in 2003 to 5,200 in 2004.
Numbers have since decreased to 4,500 in 2005.The
data are not fully comparable; however, the general
trend is clear: inflows have been very moderate and
even declining.
Furthermore, fears of welfare tourism did not mate-
rialise, as utilisation of social welfare benefits so far
has been very limited.
Under EU Regulation 1408/71,
which aims at fostering the free
movement of persons between
the Member States, any person
entitled to family benefits in any
EU Member State has a right to
benefits for his/her family mem-
bers even if these live in another
Member State.These family ben-
efits include benefits for children
and parenthood, housing allow-
ances as well as study allowances.
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1 This section is based on a recent publi-
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In practice,any EU citizen working in Sweden could
export these benefits to his/her family members liv-
ing in another EU Member State.A report covering
the period from March to December 2004 found that
the possibility of exporting social benefits to the ten
new Member States had only been used to a very lim-
ited extent.Rather,social family benefits for families
with children were more commonly exported to the
Nordic countries.
As commissioned by the Swedish government, the
Unemployment Insurance Inspectorate presented
quarterly reports on EU certificates from each Mem-
ber State that involve payment of Swedish unem-
ployment insurance coverage. The quarterly reports
for the third and the fourth quarter in 2004 indicated
only low levels of usage.Among 800 applications to
export unemployment insurance, only four involved
a new Member State in the third quarter, and nine
out of 740 in the fourth quarter.
Moreover monitoring measures were also directed
at social security benefits in accordance with the
Social Services Law. A report presented in 2005
noted that, as of September 2004, there had been no
significant increase in utilisation of such social bene-
fits since enlargement (Tamas and Münz 2006).
Therefore, concerns about a potential abuse of the
social welfare system – Sweden acting as a magnet
for social tourism – were unfounded.
Immigration and public finances2
When examining the social welfare effects of migra-
tion,it is useful to have a closer look at the literature
on the impact of immigration in general – i.e.includ-
ing third-country nationals.
The European experience with immigrants’ contri-
bution to the public coffer is mixed. In a number of
countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France,the Netherlands and Switzerland immigrants
are apparently more dependent on the welfare sys-
tem than the native population. However, in several
other countries, such as Germany, Greece, Portugal,
Spain and UK, immigrants make a similar or even
higher contribution to the treasury compared to na-
tives (IOM 2005).
A Home Office study calculated that immigrants
make a positive net contribution to the UK economy
(Gott and Johnston 2002). It estimates that in
1999/2000 immigrants in the UK contributed US$ 4
billion more in taxes than they received in benefits.
Furthermore, if intergenerational considerations are
taken into account, the contribution made by immi-
grants may be higher since second generation immi-
grants,i.e.children of immigrants,are likely to be net
tax payers.
Germany has had very large immigrant inflows, in-
cluding ethnic Germans from Central Europe and
CIS countries, labour migrants, asylum seekers and
family members joining spouses or parents already
living in this country. Germany also has a progressive
tax structure and rather generous welfare provisions.
Thus, the immigrant fiscal transfers ultimately de-
pend on immigrant employment opportunities, given
rigid labour markets (Bevelander 2000). A recent
ILO study stressed that 78 percent of immigrants in
Germany are of working age and, thus, an average
immigrant makes a positive net contribution, up to
EUR 50,000 over his/her lifetime (ILO 2004).
The latest study on the share of immigrants’ contri-
bution to the public coffer, published in October
2006, concludes that immigrants contributed on
average EUR 1,840 more to the tax and social secu-
rity system in Germany in 2004 than they received in
benefits. If calculated on the basis of the 15 million
people in Germany with a migration background
(including foreigners, naturalised migrants and per-
sons who have migrant ancestors),the surplus would
be even higher, given that naturalised migrants and
persons who have migrant ancestors are generally
better educated and integrated than more recent
migrants (Bonin 2006).
The Swedish example highlights how public trans-
fers to foreign-born persons are sensitive to two key
determinants: education and residence status. For
example, if refugees in Sweden had had the mini-
mum (or compulsory) level of education in 1992,
then their public finance transfers would have been
negative for almost their entire life. On the other
hand,if the Swedish foreign-born residents had been
admitted as non-refugees with university education,
then the public finance transfers would have exceed-
ed the average Swedish-born contribution by a
three-fold margin. However, the refugee portion of
the Swedish population did not result in a positive
transfer, and this led to calls for a limitation in the
2This section is primarily based on a new study by Münz et al.(2006).
See also similar conclusions in Diez Guardia and Pichelmann (2006).admission of foreign-born persons in general
(DeVoretz 2006).
Another example shows that the specific skill and
origin structure of the immigrants in Spain resulted
in positive effects both economically and for the
social security system (OECD 2003). EU foreigners
who bring capital with them (usually elderly British,
Dutch and German pension receivers) increase
demand,e.g.real estate prices grew by 30 percent per
year for the period 1995-2001. They also contribute
through direct and indirect taxes. The highly skilled
pay relatively high income taxes,while they are often
accompanied by investment flows, require less per
capita spending and have limited claims to the
Spanish pension and social security system. This is
partly the case also with temporary workers,who are
net contributors to the treasury in the short run.
In Italy, successive regularisation programmes have
resulted in very large numbers of legalised immi-
grants joining the formal sector, thus widening the
tax base and enhancing social security revenue
(OECD 2005).
Different studies mentioned here used different
methodologies, i.e. in the benefits and contributions
considered, the area of analysis, and in the way the
value of the services provided was calculated.
However,the size and direction of the public finance
transfers clearly depend, first of all, on the charac-
teristics of the immigrants: education and skills, age,
family status, and countries of origin. Second of all,
public transfers towards migrants seem to depend
also on their mode of entry and on the access to the
educational system and the labour market, the
recognition of qualifications and skills, and thus on
the integration policy of the receiving country.
Accordingly,the employment rates of EU-15 nation-
als in other EU-15 countries are high (as already
shown for the case of Germany). The average
employment rate within the EU is 67.0 percent: 73.6
percent for males and 60.4 percent for females
(Münz et al. 2006).
A question of immobility
Compared to the United States, Europe is charac-
terised by relatively low rates of mobility of people.
As far as intra-EU mobility is concerned,this pertains
to occupational and geographical movements within
as well as between the EU Member States (European
Commission 2002).This is also the case with regard to
the East-West migration patterns. There have been
many econometric studies forecasting the East-West
migration potential.Independent of the methodology,
this research tends to show a long run migration po-
tential in the range of two to four percent of the
source populations. Cumulated over 15 years this is
about three million people,or about 1.2 percent of the
working-age population of the EU-15 and certainly
not enough to affect the EU labour market in gener-
al. However, some countries and regions in Germany
and Austria could face some short-run adjustment
problems and labour market disturbances (Diez
Guardia and Pichelmann 2006, 16).
Nevertheless, from a more long-term perspective, it
remains the case that less than two percent of
Europeans currently live in a country other than
their own.The phenomenon of immobility has tradi-
tionally been explained by high transport and trans-
action costs or institutional obstacles and risk adver-
sity.While transport and transaction costs have been
falling and progress has been made in the EU to
remove obstacles to migration, internal movement
rates have had a tendency to decrease substantially
since the late 1960s and 1970s, and mobility between
the EU Member States is still low.
An alternative approach to explaining immobility 
is what we call the Insider-Advantage Approach
(Fischer 1999). This approach stresses that during
periods of immobility at a particular location individ-
uals invest in the accumulation of location-specific
skills, abilities and assets. Here, we differentiate
between insider advantages according to their origin
(work- or leisure-related) and specificity (firm-,place-
or society-specific).
Place-specific advantages make the individual partic-
ularly attractive for all or at least some firms in
his/her region of work. Examples of such insider
advantages are expertise in the location-specific pref-
erences,desires and habits of clients or insider knowl-
edge of the peculiarities of the political situation in a
region. Society-specific advantages broadly emanate
from the social relations and political activities an
immobile individual builds up within the society in
which he/she is residing (lobbying, political net-
works). Examples of leisure-oriented place-specific
insider advantages can range from information about
the “good-value-for-money” Italian restaurant to
knowledge about the cultural events and the local
housing market. Society-specific leisure-oriented
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insider advantages capture the utility increase a deci-
sion-maker and his/her family get from having
friends, being socially integrated, accepted and active
at a certain place of residence. These insider advan-
tages result from a locational investment in social
capital that encompasses a wide range of human con-
tacts, from family relations and friendships to mem-
bership of clubs and political parties. Mobility gener-
ally leads to a loss of most of these assets and requires
new investments in obtaining a “ticket to entry” at a
new place of residence (Fischer et al. 2000).
The empirical experience of the old EU clearly
shows that people’s social and cultural ties to their
local environment are an important obstacle to
intra-EU migration. Most people want to live, work
and stay immobile where they have their roots.
People usually prefer the status quo to an unfamiliar
or insecure change.The simple abolishment of legal
impediments to migration is usually insufficient to
overcome individual (microeconomic,social and cul-
tural) obstacles to migration and to overshoot the
value of immobility. Intra-EU labour migration has
proved to be mainly demand-determined: it usually
depends to a major extent on the needs and employ-
ment opportunities in the immigration countries.
In the EU, trade has reacted much faster and more
elastically to economic integration than labour. The
removal of formal and informal protectionist obsta-
cles led to a strong increase in intra-community
trade. The equalisation of good and factor prices
expected on the basis of the neoclassic Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson international economic theory
thus materialised through trade rather than through
the increased mobility of labour. To an important
degree, trade has so far replaced the economic
demand for internal migration in the EU.
It might be that empirical evidence from the previ-
ous lifting of mobility restrictions does not apply to
the EU enlargement to the East. However, we
believe that we have good theoretical arguments (i.e.
the neoclassical trade theory of the Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson models and their factor-price-
equalisation-theorem) and strong empirical evi-
dence that again, as in all the years before, the
improvement in the standard of living in Eastern
Europe due to full EU membership will invoke a
very effective anti-migration impact. Rather sooner
than later,the intra-EU migration of relatively poor-
ly qualified workers might follow a migration substi-
tuting the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
pattern. Trade and capital flows will more or less
replace the need for strong migration flows of rather
unskilled workers. It is cheaper to move standard-
ised products and machines than people. However,
the migration of relatively highly qualified workers
might follow the Ricardian (or New Growth) pattern
of a self-feeding, dynamic core-periphery process.
People with skills and knowledge might go to the
centres that make them more attractive for capital
and skilled workers in a next round. Rich agglomer-
ations and poor periphery regions might be the long-
term consequence.Thus welfare tourism might then
be the end but certainly not the beginning of an
intra-EU mobility story.
Conclusions
This paper has briefly reviewed some available evi-
dence and noteworthy arguments as to why the
European Union Directive 2004/38/EC is unlikely to
change the current intra-EU mobility patterns sig-
nificantly or to boost the welfare migration of EU
nationals. The evidence presented revolves around
two general observations. First, EU citizens have
been rather immobile until now and migration
between EU Member States has not yet become a
means of stabilising asymmetric shocks in Europe.
Second, the observed migration flows are mainly
triggered by labour market conditions, such as
income differentials or higher unemployment rates,
especially in the regions of origin. Therefore, EU
nationals changing their residence inside Europe are
a positively selected group both in terms of their per-
sonal characteristics (such as age or education) and
of their labour market performance (participation
and employment rates, as well as wages).
Moreover, the theoretical arguments for immobility
discussed above make a continuation of these
observed patterns, even after the full implementa-
tion of the Directive 2004/38/EC,the more plausible.
Not only will Europeans stay predominantly immo-
bile, but those who move are more likely to be
attracted by differentials in economic conditions
between regions than by the variation in welfare
provision across countries.This is in line with predic-
tions based on neo-classical migration models,which
underline the self-selective nature of migration: only
the highly motivated will have incentives to over-
come mobility barriers, and they will choose among
potential destinations by maximising the returns to
their human capital. Higher wages, uneven incomedistributions and flexible labour market conditions
are therefore more attractive for this group than
welfare payments.
Finally, it is precisely the much debated case of migra-
tion from Eastern Europe following EU enlargement
that provides one more rationale in our argumenta-
tion. Although some authors have used the higher
propensity of East Europeans to migrate in order to
predict a flood into those EU-15 countries which pro-
vide the more generous welfare benefits, a refined
look at current patterns disproves this notion. While
previous econometric studies found some small effects
of welfare magnets on the migration decisions of EU-
15 nationals, these are levelled out in the case of East-
West migrants. Apart from income differentials and
labour market conditions,there are particularly strong
network effects and social interactions (like learning
or herding) that determine the dynamics of migration
flows and thus entirely offset any effects of variations
in welfare institutions. However, the interaction
between the social dynamics of migration choices and
welfare provisions is not yet fully understood and will
remain on the research agenda in the near future.
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